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2Abstract
Inhibition of no-longer relevant go responses supports flexible and goal-directed behavior. 
The present study explored if the interaction between going and stopping is influenced by 
monetary incentives. Subjects (N = 108) performed a selective stop-change task, which 
required them to stop and change a go response if a valid signal occurred, but to execute the 
planned go response if invalid signals or no signals occurred. There were two incentive 
groups: the punishment group lost points for unsuccessful valid-signal trials, whereas the 
reward group gained points for successful valid-signal trials. There was also a control group 
that could not win or lose points on any trials. We found that, compared with the control 
group, incentives encouraged subjects to slow down on no-signal trials, suggesting proactive 
control adjustments. Furthermore, latencies of valid change responses were shorter in the 
incentive groups than in the control group, suggesting improvements in executing an 
alternative response. However, incentives did not modulate stop latency or the interaction 
between going and stopping on valid-signal trials much. Finally, Bayesian analyses indicated 
that there was no difference between the reward and punishment groups. These findings are 
inconsistent with the idea that reward and punishment have distinct effects on stop 
performance. 
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3Response inhibition is a hallmark of executive control, and receives a great deal of attention 
across disciplines (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists 
have explored the cognitive and neural mechanisms of response inhibition, developmental 
scientists have studied the ‘rise and fall’ of inhibitory control capacities across the life span, 
and clinical researchers have examined correlations between individual differences in 
response inhibition and behaviors such as substance abuse, overeating, and risk taking. A 
popular task to study response inhibition is the stop-signal task. In this task, subjects are 
instructed to respond quickly to a go stimulus (the go component of the task), but to withhold 
their response when a stop signal occurs after a variable stop-signal delay (the stop 
component of the task). On stop-signal trials, performance can be modeled as an independent 
race between a go process, triggered by the presentation of a go stimulus, and a stop process, 
triggered by the presentation of the stop signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984); go responses are 
successfully inhibited when the stop process finishes before the go process (signal-inhibit), 
but are incorrectly executed when the go process finishes before the stop process (signal-
respond; Figure 1). Thus, successful stop performance requires a ‘reactive’ system that 
quickly detects signals and activates the appropriate stop response. However, optimal 
performance in response-inhibition tasks also requires ‘proactive’ control to find a balance 
between competing task demands (i.e. responding quickly vs. stopping; Aron, 2011; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). In the present study, we examined how task balance and the 
race between going and stopping are influenced by monetary incentives in a selective stop-
change task. 
Many studies have shown that going and stopping are independent for most of their 
durations in standard stop-signal and stop-change tasks (e.g., Logan, 1981; Logan & Burkell, 
1986; Verbruggen, Schneider, & Logan, 2008; Yamaguchi, Logan, & Bissett, 2012). For 
4example, the independent horse-race model predicts that mean signal-respond RT should be 
shorter than mean no-signal RT because the former only represents the mean of those 
responses that were fast enough to escape inhibition, whereas the latter represents the mean 
of all go responses (Figure 1). This prediction has been confirmed by many stop-signal 
studies (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). Studies using stop-change tasks have provided further 
support for the independence assumption. In stop-change tasks, subjects are instructed to 
cancel the originally planned go response and execute an alternative ‘change’ response when 
a signal occurs. Experimental, computational, and neuro-imaging work suggests that subjects 
first inhibit the original go response followed by the execution of the alternative change 
response, and that similar (neural) stopping mechanisms are involved in simple stop tasks and 
stop-change tasks (Boecker et al., 2013; Camalier et al., 2007; Elchlepp & Verbruggen, 2016; 
Jha et al., 2015; Verbruggen, Schneider, et al., 2008). Importantly, in stop-change tasks, 
stopping is also not influenced by go processing in the primary task (Logan & Burkell, 1986) 
or by the selection and execution of the change response (Verbruggen, Schneider, et al., 
2008), which is consistent with the independent race model.
These stop-signal and stop-change findings are intriguing because most research on 
multitasking indicates that central-processing capacity1 is limited, resulting in a performance 
decrement when two stimuli associated with different tasks (or task components) are 
presented in rapid succession (Pashler, 1994). In other words, there is usually dependence 
when two or more tasks overlap. In standard stop-signal and stop-change tasks, stop and go 
processes do not seem to share capacity in this way (i.e. there is independence).
1. ‘Processing capacity’ can be formalized as a measure of the rate of processing. A process has 
limited capacity if its rate decreases as more processes enter the race (see e.g. Logan, van Zandt, 
Verbruggen, & Wagenmakers, 2014). This could be due to competition between stimulus and response 
representations (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015).
5Figure 1: The independent race in a stop-change task. When the stop and go process are independent, 
only the fastest responses escape inhibition (Logan & Cowan, 1984). Consequently, signal-respond 
Go1-RT should be shorter than no-signal Go1-RT: The former reflects the mean of the fastest 
responses that escaped inhibition (i.e. the responses on the left of the vertical dotted line), whereas the 
latter reflects the mean of the whole Go1-RT distribution. See Verbruggen and Logan (2015) for an 
elaborate discussion. CSD = change-signal delay; SSRT = stop-signal reaction time, which is the 
covert latency of the stop process.
A different picture emerges when multiple stop signals are introduced. In selective 
stop-signal tasks, different signals are presented and subjects must stop if one of them occurs 
(valid signal), but not if the others occur (invalid signals). Thus, this task introduces a 
decisional component to the stop-signal task; as such, it may provide a richer model of action 
control than standard stop-signal or stop-change tasks. Bissett and Logan (2014) found that 
signal-respond RT was sometimes longer than no-signal RT in selective stop-signal tasks, 
suggesting that selecting the appropriate response to the signal interacts with ongoing go 
processes (violating the assumptions of the independence race model)2. 
The ‘dependence’ conclusion was further supported by a recent study that used a 
selective stop-change task to examine the interaction between going and stopping on signal 
2. Stop-signal and stop-change studies that have used only one signal indicate that simply presenting a 
signal does not slow RTs (i.e. signal-respond RT is shorter than no-signal RT in most studies).
6trials (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). In the primary task, subjects responded to a go stimulus 
(Go1 response). On some trials, a signal occurred. When the signal was valid, subjects had to 
stop the Go1 response and replace it with another response (Go2 or change response). When 
the signal was invalid, subjects had to execute the planned Go1 response (they had to ignore 
the signal). Signal validity was indicated by a cue at the beginning of a trial. For many 
subjects, latencies of Go1 responses on no-signal trials (no-signal Go1-RT) were shorter than 
Go1 latencies on valid-signal trials on which response inhibition failed (signal-respond Go1-
RT) and Go1 latencies on invalid-signal trials (invalid-signal Go1-RT). This RT pattern was 
similar to the pattern observed in selective stop tasks in which subjects did not have to 
execute a secondary response (Bissett & Logan, 2014). However, these findings are 
inconsistent with the independent race model, which assumes that going and stopping are 
independent for most of their durations (Figure 1; Logan & Cowan, 1984). Instead, they 
suggest that the decision to stop interfered with go processing. In other words, going and 
stopping are dependent and have to share limited central processing capacity in selective stop 
tasks (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). 
The level of dependence (or interaction) between going and stopping may be 
influenced by response strategies. In this context, a strategy is defined as “an optional 
organization of cognitive resources or abilities that is designed to achieve some goal in some 
task environment” (Logan, 1985, p. 194). Several strategies can be used to perform a task, 
and which strategy is used at a particular moment can be influenced by voluntary decisions 
(e.g. subjects may determine their strategy at the beginning of a block; see e.g. Strayer & 
Kramer, 1994) and task-related or environmental factors (e.g. positive or negative outcomes, 
or the relative frequency of certain events). For example, Bissett & Logan (2014) found that 
signal-respond Go1-RT did not differ much from no-signal Go1-RT when most signals were 
7invalid, but it was shorter when most signals were valid. This finding suggests that stopping 
was prioritized more when most signals were valid: When stopping is fully prioritized, the 
stop process is not influenced much by processing in the go task; hence, only the fastest trials 
can escape inhibition, as predicted by the independent race model (see Figure 1). Research on 
dual-tasking provides further support for the idea that task prioritization can be influenced by 
strategic and environmental factors. When two stimuli are presented in rapid succession, 
prioritizing the first task leads to serial processing (i.e. central processing in the Go2 task only 
starts when central processing in the Go1 task is finished). This is often the most 
advantageous processing mode because it reduces response competition (Logan & Gordon, 
2001; Meyer & Kieras, 1997). But in some situations, overall task performance may benefit 
from prioritizing both tasks more equally (Miller, Ulrich, & Rolke, 2009). For example, the 
likelihood of equal task prioritization (i.e. central processing in the Go1 and Go2 tasks occurs 
simultaneously) increases when there are more short delays than long delays (Miller et al., 
2009). 
The present study
In the present study, we examined if the balance or competition between going and 
stopping in selective stop tasks could be influenced by monetary incentives. Previous work 
indicates that incentive motivation can influence performance in standard stop-signal tasks 
(for a general review on motivation and cognition, see Braver et al., 2014). The influence of 
incentives on performance depends on how they are delivered or manipulated. In some 
studies, reward for successful stops was delivered in a block-based fashion (i.e. subjects were 
informed at the beginning of a block or run of trials that successful stop performance would 
be rewarded; see e.g. Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; Leotti & Wager, 2010). This incentive 
manipulation enhanced stop performance on stop-signal trials, but slowed responding on no-
8signal trials. We observed similar findings in two pilot studies that are reported in 
Supplementary Materials3: when successful withhold/change performance (in a hybrid 
version of the go/no-go and stop-change paradigm; Pilot Experiment 1) or stop performance 
(in a standard stop-signal paradigm; Pilot Experiment 2) were incentivized, go responses in 
the primary task were slower (despite a strict response deadline) but performance on signal 
trials was (numerically) improved. Combined, these studies indicate that subjects trade speed 
in the go task (e.g. by increasing response thresholds or adjusting attentional settings) for 
success in the stop task when successful stop performance is rewarded in a block-based (or 
experiment-based) fashion. Note that when go performance is rewarded, response latencies or 
accuracy on no-signal trials tend to decrease and stopping is impaired (Pessoa & Padmala, 
2010). Thus, rewards can change the balance between going and stopping in both directions.
Incentives can influence stop performance in other ways as well. In a series of studies, 
Boehler and colleagues (e.g. Boehler, Hopf, Stoppel, & Krebs, 2012; Boehler, Schevernels, 
Hopf, Stoppel, & Krebs, 2014) showed reward-related information at the moment of the stop 
signal presentation (i.e. the color of the stop signal indicated whether subjects would receive 
an extra reward for successful stop performance or not). They found that SSRT was shorter 
and that key regions of the neural inhibitory control network were activated more on reward 
trials than on non-reward trials (for a review, see Krebs, Hopf, & Boehler, 2016). These 
findings cannot be attributed to a simple trade off between going quickly and stopping 
because the reward signal is presented after the presentation of the go stimulus. Of course, 
global attentional and response settings could be influenced by the occasional delivery of 
reward; thus, even in the studies of Boehler and colleagues, proactive control or task settings 
3. These pilot studies were designed to examine the effect of reward and punishment on reactive 
control. We found strong effects of incentives on response slowing in the primary go task, but only 
weak effects on measures of reactive control. Therefore, we decided to examine the effect of 
incentives on response-strategy selection and task prioritization in the present study.
9could be modulated by reward (Schevernels et al., 2015). Furthermore, a study of Rosell-
Negre et al (2014) indicates that incentives can influence strategy adjustments after signal 
trials. In sum, previous studies indicate that performance on stop-signal trials in standard stop 
tasks (i.e. with only one signal) improves when incentives for successful stopping are 
provided, which could be due to preactivation of the stopping network, control adjustments, 
or both. 
In the present study, we examined if incentives could change the balance between 
going and stopping and the degree of dependence or capacity sharing in selective stop 
situations. We explained the incentive structure at the beginning of the experiment and it 
remained the same throughout the whole experiment. Furthermore, we incentivized stopping 
only. Based on previous studies, we predicted that this incentive scheme would encourage 
subjects to make proactive strategy adjustments at the beginning of the task (cf. Strayer & 
Kramer, 1994). Such adjustments could influence responding on no-signal trials as subjects 
trade speed in the go task for success in the stop task (see above). Furthermore, we predicted 
that incentives would influence the interaction between going and stopping on valid-signal 
trials: when stopping is prioritized (due to the incentives for stopping), it will not be 
influenced much by going (i.e. independence); by contrast, when go and stop processing are 
prioritized more equally on signal trials, stopping will be influenced by ongoing go processes 
(i.e. dependence). 
We included two incentive conditions, namely a reward condition and a punishment 
condition. Previous work suggests that reward and punishment can have distinct effects on go 
and stop performance (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012; Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & 
McLaren, 2014). Furthermore, reward and punishment schemes may influence strategy 
selection differently. For example, Braver, Paxton, Locke, and Barch (2009) found that a 
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reward scheme encouraged a proactive control mode, whereas a punishment scheme 
encouraged a more reactive control mode. 
Even though we were mostly interested in strategy selection (i.e. how is a task 
performed) and the balance between going and stopping, we also wanted to explore the 
effects of incentives on reactive control measures (as previous studies, as mentioned above, 
found effects of incentives on both proactive and reactive control). Therefore, we used a 
selective stop-change task (instead of a selective stop task) because it provides us with two 
measures of ‘reactive’ action control on valid signal trials: the latency of the stop response 
(stop-signal reaction time or SSRT) and the latency of the change response (see also 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). As noted above, the underlying response inhibition mechanisms 
in stop and stop-change tasks are very similar. However, SSRT can only be estimated when 
the assumptions of the race model are met, whereas the latency of the change response is 
measured directly. In other words, the stop-change task provides an index of reactive action 
control even when the assumptions of the independence race model are violated (and we 
expected such violations, especially in the control condition).
Experiment
In the primary task, subjects responded to a letter (Go1 response). On some trials, a 
signal appeared on the left or right of the go stimulus (Figure 2). When the signal was valid, 
subjects had to stop their planned Go1 response and respond to the location of the signal 
instead (Go2 or change response). When the signal was invalid, subjects had to ignore it and 
execute the planned Go1 response. Signal validity was indicated by a visual cue at the 
beginning of a trial (Figure 2). There were three groups. The punishment group lost points for 
unsuccessful valid-signal trials. The reward group gained points for successful valid-signal 
trials. Finally, the control group could not win or lose points on any trials.
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Incentives may encourage subjects to make proactive strategy adjustments (see 
above). Such adjustments often influence responding on no-signal trials as subjects trade 
speed in the go task for success in the stop task (Aron, 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). 
Therefore, in a first analysis, we examined how Go1-RTs on no-signal trials changed over 
time in the three groups. We predicted that incentives on valid-signal trials would encourage 
subjects to slow down (i.e. alter their speed/accuracy trade-off). Note that we focused on 
Go1-RTs only to get a ‘pure’ measure of proactive control adjustments; after all, stop-change 
performance on successful valid-signal trials is influenced by both proactive and reactive 
control processes. We used a similar analysis approach in our previous studies that examined 
proactive inhibitory control (e.g. Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). 
In a second analysis, we compared Go1-RTs on no-signal and failed valid-signal trials 
to examine the interaction between going and stopping on signal trials. We predicted that the 
‘no-signal Go1-RT minus signal-respond Go1-RT’ difference would be larger in the incentive 
conditions than in the control condition. When stopping is prioritized on valid-signal trials, 
stopping is not influenced much by going; consequently, signal-respond Go1-RT should be 
shorter than no-signal Go1-RT (Bissett & Logan, 2014; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Figure 1). By 
contrast, when go and stop processing are prioritized more equally on signal trials, stopping 
is influenced by ongoing go processes; consequently, the difference between signal-respond 
and no-signal Go1-RT should become smaller or even reverse (Bissett & Logan, 2014; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). For completeness, we also analyzed invalid-signal Go1-RT. 
In a third analysis, we analyzed change (Go2) performance and explored the 
correlation between response slowing and improvements in change performance. We also 
analyzed stop-signal latencies of subjects for which the assumptions of the independent race 
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model were not violated. Finally, we report an exploratory analysis of sequential effects in the 
three conditions. 
Figure 2: Examples of the three trial types in the selective stop-change task. The top panel shows the 
sequence of events on no-signal trials (NS). The middle panel shows the sequence of events on 
invalid-signal trials (IVS), and the bottom panel shows the sequence of events on valid-signal trials 
(VS). Signal validity was indicated by the cue (the centrally presented chequerboard) at the beginning 
of the trial. The arrows under the letters indicate the correct response. CSD = change-signal delay. See 
the Method section for further details. 
Method
Subjects. 108 volunteers (36 per condition) from the University of Exeter participated 
for monetary compensation (£5) or partial course credit. The number of subjects was 
determined in advance, based on a power calculation for the main effects of interest. As 
indicated above, effects of reward on strategy selection and task prioritization could be tested 
by comparing RTs for the different trial types. In our previous study, the RTs correlated 
strongly (e.g. the correlation between no-signal Go1-RT and invalid-signal Go1-RT was 
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r(191) = .93, p < .001; Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). Therefore, a power calculation indicated 
that the present experiment was sufficiently powered (.80) to detect between-within factor 
interactions with a small effect size. Note that for completeness, we also analyzed change-
RTs and SSRTs in the three conditions. However, we could only detect (very) large effects in 
these analyses (with power = .80), so these ‘reactive’ control results should be interpreted 
with caution. 
P(correct) on valid-signal trials was close to .50 for most subjects in Verbruggen and 
Logan (2015). Therefore, we had decided (before data collection had started) to replace 
subjects for which p(correct) > .70 or p(correct) < .30 in the present study. Three subjects 
(Control: 1; Punishment: 2) were replaced. We used the integration method to estimate SSRT 
(see below); therefore, we used a more lenient exclusion criterion than the one used for the 
mean SSRT estimation method (e.g. Verbruggen, Logan, & Stevens, 2008). 
Apparatus, stimuli and procedure. The experiment was run on a 21.5-inch iMac 
using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). The Go1 stimuli were the letters ‘U’ and ‘D’ (size: 
approximately 2 x 4 mm). Subjects responded to them by pressing the ‘up’ (U) and 
‘down’ (D) arrow keys of a standard keyboard with their right middle finger. The Go1 stimuli 
were centrally presented in a black font (Courier) on a light grey background (RGB = 175 
175 175). There were four stop-change signals (chequerboards; size: 12 x 12 mm), which 
varied along two dimensions: the number of squares inside the board (3x3 or 9x9), and the 
color (red: RGB = 255 0 0, or blue: RGB = 0 0 255). Signals appeared approximately 4 cm 
on the left or right of the Go1 stimulus. Subjects responded to the location of valid signals 
(Go2 or change response) by pressing the corresponding arrow key with their right index (left 
arrow) or right ring (right arrow) finger.
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All trials started with the presentation of a signal cue (one of the chequerboards) in 
the center of the screen for 500 ms (Figure 2). This cue indicated the valid signal, which 
could change on every trial. The cue was replaced by a black fixation cross for 500 ms, after 
which a letter (the Go1 stimulus) appeared. Subjects had to decide whether the letter was ‘U’ 
or ‘D’. The letter remained on the screen for 1,500 ms, regardless of RT (a similar maximum 
RT has been used in previous stop-signal studies). 
On 1/3 of the trials, a signal was presented on the left or right of the letter after a 
variable delay. When the signal matched the cue (valid signal), subjects had to withhold the 
Go1 (up/down) response and respond to the location of the signal instead (Go2 response; left/
right). When the signal did not match the cue (invalid signal), subjects had to ignore it and 
execute the planned Go1 response. Consistent with our previous research (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2015), the location of the signals was randomized and the 4 signals occurred with 
equal probability in random order. Thus, only 25% of the signal trials–or 8.33% of all trials–
were valid-signal trials, and trial types were fully randomized. The change-signal delay 
(CSD) was initially set at 250 ms and continuously adjusted according to a tracking 
procedure to obtain a probability of successful valid-change performance of .50. Each time a 
subject responded to the Go1 stimulus or failed to execute the correct Go2 response on a 
valid-signal trial, CSD decreased by 50 ms. When subjects successfully replaced the Go1 
response on a valid-signal trial, CSD increased by 50 ms. Subjects were informed about this 
tracking procedure and they were told not to wait for a change signal to occur. CSD for 
invalid-signal trials was yoked to the valid-signal CSD. 
At the end of each trial, we presented feedback for 750 ms. On no-signal and invalid-
signal trials, we presented ‘correct’, ‘incorrect’, or ‘too slow’ (in case subjects did not 
respond before the end of the trial). The feedback message on valid-signal trials differed 
15
between groups. In the punishment group, we presented: ‘change: correct’ when subjects 
successfully replaced the Go1 response, or ‘change: incorrect. You lose 40 points’ when 
subjects executed the Go1 (up/down) response or executed an incorrect Go2 (left/right) 
response. In the reward group, we presented ‘change: correct. You win 40 points’ for 
successful valid-signal trials, or ‘change: incorrect’ for unsuccessful valid-signal trials. In the 
control group, we presented ‘change: correct’ or ‘change: incorrect’ for successful and 
unsuccessful valid-signal trials, respectively. The next trial started after a further 500 ms. 
Subjects in the punishment and reward groups were informed at the beginning of the 
experiment that the points would be converted into money (100 points = £0.1) at the end of 
the experiment, but only if overall performance on no-signal and invalid-signal trials was also 
satisfactory (i.e. if they responded correctly and in time on the majority of trials). The start 
balance was 2,500 points in the Punishment group, and 0 points in the Reward group. There 
were 64 valid-signal trials in the experiment. Due to the tracking procedure, both groups 
ended with approximately 1,250 points (£1.25).
The experiment consisted of 768 trials in total. Subjects received a break after every 
64 trials. During the break, we presented subjects’ mean no-signal Go1-RT, the number of 
incorrect and missed no-signal responses, and the percentage of correctly replaced responses 
on valid-signal trials. Subjects had to pause for 15 seconds.
Analyses
All data processing and analyses were completed using R. All data files and R scripts 
are deposited on the Open Research Exeter data repository (http://hdl.handle.net/
10871/24540)
Descriptive and inferential statistics appear in Tables 1-5 and Figure 3. We also 
calculated Bayes factors for all main effects and interaction contrasts in the ANOVA designs, 
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and present an overview of these analyses in Supplementary Materials. Part (first half vs. 
second half of the experiment) was included in the analyses because go performance may 
gradually change over time in the incentive conditions (Leotti & Wager, 2010). Furthermore, 
reward and punishment can influence learning in response-inhibition tasks (Guitart-Masip et 
al., 2012; but see also Krebs et al., 2016, for a discussion of reward and practice effects). 
For the reasons discussed above, we focused primarily on Go1-RTs in the analyses 
reported below. For completeness, we analyzed latency of the stop response (SSRT) and the 
change response on successful valid-signal trials as performance on these trials could be 
influenced by changes in reactive control, proactive control, or both. We calculated SSRT 
using the integration method (Verbruggen et al., 2013). To account for response slowing, we 
calculated SSRT for each part separately, and then took the average (as recommended in 
Verbruggen et al., 2013). The independent race model assumes that stopping and going are 
independent for most of their durations. This assumption should not be taken lightly because 
SSRT cannot be reliably estimated when it is violated. Therefore, we compared signal-
respond Go1-RT with no-signal Go1-RT for each subject and part, and excluded subjects 
when signal-respond Go1-RT was longer than no-signal Go1-RT in Part 1, Part 2, or both. We 
had to exclude 46 subjects in total. The number of subjects per group appears in Table 4.  
We also performed an exploratory sequential analysis in which we compared no-
signal performance on trials that followed a correct no-signal trial, a correct invalid-signal 
trial, an unsuccessful (signal-respond) valid-signal trial, or a successful (signal-inhibit) valid-
signal trial. There were not enough incorrect no-signal and invalid-signal trials to explore 
how Go1 errors influenced subsequent performance. For similar reasons, we could not 
explore how sequential effects influenced performance on invalid and valid signal trials. 
Measurements of post-signal slowing can be contaminated by global fluctuations in 
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performance over the course of an experiment (Nelson, Boucher, Logan, Palmeri, & Schall, 
2010). For example, when RTs gradually become longer in a block, probability of stopping 
will temporarily decrease (as the tracking procedure may need some time to catch up). This 
will also influence the measurement of post-signal slowing because trials that follow a 
successful stop are more likely to come from slower parts of the block or experiment than 
trials that follow an unsuccessful stop. There is a solution for this problem: post-signal 
slowing can be quantified as the RT difference between the post-signal trial and the last 
preceding no-signal trial (Nelson et al., 2010; see Dutilh et al., 2012 for a similar solution to 
control for global fluctuations in post-error paradigms). For example, when a no-signal trial 
(trial n) was preceded by another no-signal trial (trial n-1), the RT difference is ‘RT trial n’ 
minus ‘RT trial n-1’. If trial n-1 was an invalid-signal trial but trial n-2 was a no-signal trial, 
the RT difference is ‘RT trial n’ minus ‘RT trial n-2’. 
Finally, we report the descriptive and inferential statistics for the accuracy data of the 
go task in Appendix A. The accuracy data for the change task appear in Table 3. Note that we 
used a tracking procedure to determine the change-signal delay (like most stop-signal and 
stop-change studies; see Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 2013). This procedure typically 
results in a p(respond|signal) ≈ .50, and compensates for individual or group differences in go 
or stop latencies. Therefore, incentives were not expected to influence probability of 
executing the primary task response on valid-signal trials. However, they could influence the 
latency of the change response and SSRT. 
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Results
No-signal Go1-RT.  No-signal Go1-RT increased substantially from the first half to 
the second half of the experiment in the punishment group (Part 1: M = 746 ms; Part 2: M = 
830 ms; difference: p < .001, BF = 739) and reward group (Part 1: M = 774 ms; Part 2: M = 
868 ms; difference: p < .001, BF = 169), but not in the control group (Part 1: M = 737 ms; 
Part 2: M = 760 ms; difference: p = .214, BF = 0.374). The Group by Part interaction was 
significant, p = .020 (Table 1). None of the other between-group differences was statistically 
significant after correction for multiple comparisons (Table 2). 
No-signal RTs were generally long (considering the simplicity of the primary up/
down task). This suggests that dual-task demands (i.e. updating and maintaining the relevant 
signal rule in working memory and monitoring for the signal) and response-strategy 
adjustments influenced performance in all groups, including the control group (Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2009a). However, the Group by Part interaction indicates that incentives encouraged 
subjects to slow down even more throughout the experiment. 
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Table 1: Overview of the Analyses of Variance. Latencies were analyzed by means of mixed 
ANOVAs with group (control, punishment, reward) as a between-subjects factor, and part (first half. 
vs. second half of the experiment) as within-subjects factor. For the ‘invalid-signal vs. no-signal’ and 
‘signal-respond vs. no-signal’ analyses, we also included trial type as a within-subjects factor. For the 
sequential analysis, we analysed the Go1-RT difference between trials as a function of the properties 
of the previous trial (correct no-signal, correct invalid signal, unsuccessful valid signal, or successful 
valid signal trial). p’s < .05 are in bold. 
Analysis
No-signal Go1-RT
Signal-respond vs. no-signal Go1-RT
Invalid-signal vs. no-signal Go1-RT
change-RT
Go1-RT difference (sequential analysis)
Group
Part
Group by Part
Group
Part
Trial Type
Group by Part
Group by Trial Type
Part by Trial Type
Group:Part:Trial Type
Group
Part
Trial Type
Group by Part
Group by Trial Type
Part by Trial Type
Group:Part:Trial Type
Group
Part
Group by Part
Group
Properties previous trial
Group by Previous trial
df1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
6
df2
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
315
315
SS1
190054
242421
54819
347529
333233
183236
79230
1327
12088
2851
389550
222712
847767
96683
70
50348
1011
264002
257662
3886
3025
194837
14623
SS2
7118477
704151
704151
12729865
1180176
297773
1180176
297773
175807
175807
14400830
1237161
176208
1237161
176208
80366
80366
2094082
315288
315288
244491
575693
575693
F
1.402
36.149
4.087
1.433
29.648
64.612
3.525
0.234
7.219
0.851
1.420
18.902
505.174
4.103
0.021
65.780
0.661
6.619
85.809
0.647
0.650
35.536
1.333
p
.251
< .001
.020
.243
< .001
< .001
.033
.792
.008
.430
.246
< .001
< .001
.019
.979
< .001
.519
.002
< .001
.526
.524
< .001
.242
η2gen
.024
.030
.007
.024
.023
.013
.005
.000
.001
.000
.024
.014
.051
.006
.000
.003
.000
.099
.097
.002
0.004
0.192
0.018
20
Table 2: Overview of planned comparisons to explore the Group by Part interaction for the latencies 
in the primary task (first and second set of comparisons), the main effect of group for latencies of the 
change response and stop response on valid signal-trials (the third set and fourth of comparisons), and 
the main effect of ‘previous trial properties’ in the sequential analysis (fifth set of comparisons). p’s 
< .05 after Holm-Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons are in bold. 
Note: The Bayes factor (BF) is an odds ratio: It is the probability of the data under one hypothesis 
relative to that under another. Evidence categories for Bayes Factor: BF < .33 = Substantial evidence 
for H0 ; 1/3–1 = Anecdotal evidence for H0; 1 = No evidence; 1–3 = Anecdotal evidence for HA; 3–10 
= Substantial evidence for HA; BF > 10 = strong to decisive evidence for HA. H0 = no difference 
between the trial types; HA = a difference between the trial types. We calculated the Bayes factors with 
the BayesFactor package in R, using the default prior (0.707). For the SSRT analysis, we excluded 
subjects whose signal-respond RT was longer than their no-signal RT
Comparison
No-signal Go1-RT: 
Within-group differences
No-signal Go1-RT: 
Between-group differences
Change-RT: 
Between-group differences
SSRT: 
Between-group differences
No-signal RT difference:
Property of previous trial
Control: Part 1 vs. Part 2
Punish: Part 1 vs. Part 2
Reward: Part 1 vs. Part 2
P1: Control vs. Punish
P1: Control vs. Reward
P1: Punish vs. Reward
P2: Control vs. Punish
P2: Control vs. Reward
P2: Punish vs. Reward
Control vs. Punish
Control vs. Reward
Punish vs. Reward
Control vs. Punish
Control vs. Reward
Punish vs. Reward
No-signal vs. invalid
No-signal vs. signal-respond
No-signal vs. signal-inhibit
Invalid vs. signal-respond
Invalid vs. signal-inhibit
Signal-respond vs. signal-inhibit
diff
-22
-84
-95
-9
-36
-27
-71
-109
-38
67
79
12
19
31
11
-39
-57
-45
-17
-5
12
lower 
CI
-58
-119
-140
-81
-109
-100
-172
-214
-149
18
31
-31
-19
-3
-22
-45
-70
-57
-29
-17
0
upper 
CI
13
-48
-49
62
36
46
31
-3
73
117
128
55
58
65
44
-33
-44
-32
-5
7
24
df
35
35
35
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
37
40
41
107
107
107
107
107
107
t
-1.267
-4.788
-4.244
-0.258
-1.003
-0.741
-1.392
-2.059
-0.681
2.73
3.271
0.561
1.023
1.806
0.678
-13.191
-8.641
-7.210
-2.765
-0.861
1.925
p
.214
.001
.001
.797
.319
.461
.168
.043
.498
.008
.002
.576
.313
.078
.502
< .001
< .001
< .001
.007
.391
.057
BF
0.374
739.642
169.169
0.25
0.374
0.308
0.556
1.462
0.297
5.458
19.885
0.278
0.471
1.093
0.362
1.14 x 1021
1.19 x 1011
1.08 x 108
3.916
0.153
0.630
g
0.126
0.434
0.467
0.06
0.234
0.173
0.325
0.48
0.159
0.636
0.763
0.131
0.321
0.549
0.203
2.300
1.553
1.294
0.403
0.129
0.199
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Signal-respond vs. no-signal Go1-RTs. The independent race model assumes 
independence between going and stopping, so mean signal-respond RT (i.e. RTs for trials on 
which a valid signal was presented but subjects executed the up/down Go1 response instead 
of the left/right Go2 response) should be shorter than mean no-signal RT (see Figure 1). The 
model does not make any further assumptions about whether the executed response should be 
‘match’ the stimulus (i.e. up for ‘U’ and down for ‘D’) or not. Therefore, we included all 
executed Go1 responses for this analysis (including trials when subjects pressed ‘up’ for D 
and down for ‘U’; see also Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). Note that we have repeated the 
analysis after exclusion of non-matching responses, but this did not alter the main findings 
(see Supplementary Materials). 
Descriptive statistics appear in Table 3. Consistent with the independent race model, 
signal-respond Go1-RT was on average 41 ms shorter than no-signal Go1-RT (main effect of 
trial type: p < .001). However, Figure S1 in Supplementary Materials shows that the 
independence assumption was violated for approximately 25-30% of the subjects in each 
group. In other words, for these subjects, we observed dependence or competition between 
going and stopping. This is consistent with our previous research (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2015) and the findings of Bissett and Logan (2014). Importantly, the Go1-RT difference was 
similar in the three groups (Control: 39 ms, Punishment: 39 ms, Reward: 46 ms; interaction 
Group by Trial Type: p = .792). This conclusion was further supported by the Bayesian 
analyses (Supplementary Materials). Thus, incentives did not influence the dependence 
between going and stopping (or task prioritization) on valid-signal trials. After all, the 
difference between signal-respond RTs and no-signal RTs should have been larger when 
stopping was prioritized more. 
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The significant interaction between Part and Trial Type (p = .008; Table 1) indicates 
that the signal-respond/no-signal difference increased throughout the experiment (Part 1 = 31 
ms; Part 2 = 52 ms). The Group by Part interaction (p = .033) was the only significant Group-
related effect, and provides further support for the idea that RTs generally increased 
throughout the experiment in the incentive conditions. 
Table 3. Overview of performance on valid-signal trials: Probability of responding on a valid-signal 
trial [p(respond)], average valid change-signal delay (CSD), average reaction time for Go1 responses 
on signal-respond trials (signal-respond Go1-RT), the difference between signal-respond Go1-RT and 
no-signal Go1-RT (both correct and incorrect responses were included when mean no-signal RT was 
calculated), and average reaction time for correct Go2 responses (Change-RT), as a function of part 
(first vs. second half of the experiment) and group (control, punishment, reward). 
Note: Change-RT corresponds to the time interval between the presentation of the valid signal and the 
left/right key press. Mean probability of not executing any response on valid signal trials was .02 (SD 
= .13).
Invalid-signal vs. no-signal Go1-RTs. Go1-RTs were generally longer on invalid-
signal trials (875 ms) than on no-signal trials (786 ms), which is consistent with previous 
research (Bissett & Logan, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). The significant interaction 
between Trial Type and Part (p < .001; Table 2) indicates that this difference decreased 
throughout the experiment (Part 1: 110 ms; Part 2: 67 ms). Importantly, the Go1-RT 
difference was similar in the three groups (Control: 87 ms; Punishment: 89 ms; Reward: 89 
ms; Group by Trial Type interaction: p = .979), and was observed for all subjects (Figure S1). 
The outcomes of the Bayesian analysis and the ANOVA were consistent. Thus, the ‘invalid-
Independent 
variables
Part 1
Part 2
Control
Punish
Reward
Control
Punish
Reward
P(respond)
M
0.386
0.402
0.367
0.496
0.469
0.452
sd
0.102
0.097
0.124
0.100
0.070
0.072
CSD
M
380
388
431
449
544
606
sd
135
141
149
234
265
273
Signal-respond 
Go1-RT
M
703
723
742
717
776
809
sd
136
152
177
171
200
212
No-signal Go1-
RT minus signal-
respond Go1-RT
M
35
23
34
42
54
59
sd
69
75
76
57
62
63
Change-RT
M
693
631
624
634
562
544
sd
131
99
99
113
101
96
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signal vs. no-signal’ comparison indicates that incentives did not influence how subjects 
processed invalid signals. The corresponding RT distributions (see Supplementary Materials) 
further supported this conclusion.
Figure 3: Latencies of correct Go1 responses as a function of Part (first half or second half of the 
experiment), Group (Control, Punishment, and Reward), and Trial Type (no signal vs. invalid signal). 
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Performance on valid-signal trials. Change-RT (the latency of correct Go2 
responses) was measured directly, so violations of the independence assumption (Verbruggen 
& Logan, 2015) and strategic slowing (Verbruggen et al., 2013) were not a concern. As can 
be seen in Tables 2 and 3, change-RTs were longer in the control group than in the 
punishment (difference = 67 ms; p = .008, BF = 5.458) and reward (difference = 79 ms; p = .
24
002, BF = 19.885) groups. There was no difference between the incentive conditions (p = .
576; BF = 0.278). Thus, incentives reduced the latency of change responses. Change-RT 
decreased with practice but the Group by Part analysis was not significant (Table 1), 
indicating that incentives did not enhance practice effects (for a similar finding in a simple 
stop task, see Boehler et al., 2014; see also Krebs et al., 2016).  
The no-signal RT analyses indicate that incentives encouraged subjects to slow down 
the primary-task response throughout the experiment (i.e. they made extra proactive control 
adjustments). We tested whether these adjustments influenced change-RTs. We correlated 
response-slowing in the primary go task (i.e. no-signal RT Part 2 minus no-signal RT Part 1) 
with stop-change performance (i.e. change-RT Part 2 minus change-RT Part 1). We found a 
negative correlation: when Go1-RT increased throughout the experiment, change-RT 
decreased, r(107) = -.43, p < .001. Interestingly, this negative correlation was observed in 
each group (Figure 4). Thus, proactive control adjustments influenced performance on valid-
signal trials, even when no extrinsic incentives were provided. 
Figure 4: Correlation between the response slowing on no-signal trials (no-signal Go1-RT: Part 2 
minus Part 1) and improvements in change-RT on valid-signal trials (change-RT: Part 2 minus Part 1). 
A negative correlation indicates that subjects who slow more over time show greater improvements in 
change-RT.
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As can be seen in Table 4, there were small numerical SSRT differences between the 
groups. However, these differences were not statistically significant, and the Bayes factors 
were inconclusive (Table 2). It could be argued that no SSRT differences were observed 
because the sample size was further reduced compared with the change-RT analyses. 
Therefore, we also analyzed change-RT after exclusion of those subjects for which the 
independence assumption of the race model was violated. There were still large change-RT 
differences between the incentive groups and the control group (Appendix B). In other words, 
the change-RT pattern was not influenced much by the exclusion of subjects whose signal-
respond RT was longer than their no-signal RT. 
Table 4. Overview of the number of subjects and stop performance on valid-signal trials after 
exclusion of subjects whose signal-respond RT was longer than their no-signal Go1-RT (see Analysis 
section for further details): Probability of responding on a valid-signal trial [p(respond)], average 
valid change-signal delay (CSD), stop-signal reaction time (SSRT). 
Note: for this subset of subjects, mean probability of not executing any response on valid signal trials 
was .04 (SD = .05).
We found no reliable effects of reward and punishment on SSRT in this experiment. 
In Pilot Experiment 2 (see Supplementary Materials), in which we used a stop-signal task 
with only one signal, we also found no reliable effects of reward and punishment on SSRT 
after correction for multiple comparisons, and the Bayesian analyses were inconclusive. 
However, we observed some numerical trends that were consistent with the trends observed 
here and differences observed in previous studies (e.g. Boehler et al., 2012; Greenhouse & 
Wessel, 2013). Therefore, we combined the results of the main experiment and the pilot 
experiment by calculating meta-analytic Bayes factors for multiple t tests (Rouder & Morey, 
Group
Control
Punish
Reward
N
19
20
23
P(respond)
M
.41
.40
.39
sd
.11
.08
.10
CSD
M
486
568
567
sd
206
201
212
SSRT
M
269
249
238
sd
76
69
59
26
2011). This meta-analysis revealed that reward had some beneficial effect on SSRT (BFmeta for 
Reward vs. Control = 5.11). The punishment vs. control comparison was still inconclusive 
(BFmeta = 0.65), whereas the reward vs. punishment comparison provided substantial support 
for the null hypothesis (BFmeta = 0.14). In sum, we can conclude that the incentives (and 
reward in particular) can have a beneficial effect on stop latencies, but large sample sizes are 
required to detect these differences. Because SSRT has to be estimated, it may be a noisier 
measure than go latencies, which can be measured directly. 
Sequential effect of signal presentation. The results of the experiment suggest that 
reward and punishment influenced response strategies. In a final, exploratory, analysis, we 
tested if incentives also influenced post-change-signal performance. In standard stop-signal 
tasks, response latencies are often slower after stop-signal trials than after no-stop-signal 
trials (Bissett & Logan, 2011, 2012; Nelson et al., 2010; Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; 
Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2008; see also Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008c, for a similar observation in a stop-change task with only one signal). Bissett and 
Logan (2011) contrasted several accounts of post-stop-signal slowing, and found most 
support for a strategic adjustment account that proposes that stop-signal presentation 
encourages subjects to shift priority from the go task to the stop task. Such a shift produces 
longer response latencies after a signal trial and can reduce SSRT when the stop-signal 
modality remains the same (Bissett & Logan, 2012; for similar improvements in stop 
latencies in continuous variants of the stop-signal task, see Morein-Zamir, Chua, Franks, 
Nagelkerke, Kingstone, 2007, & Verbruggen & McLaren, 2016). Findings of Rosell-Negre et 
al (2014) indicate that incentives can influence strategy adjustments after signal trials. 
Therefore, we also compared no-signal performance on trials that followed a correct no-
signal trial, a correct invalid-signal trial, an unsuccessful (signal-respond) valid-signal, or a 
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successful (signal-inhibit) valid-signal trial. As discussed in the Analysis section, post-
change-signal slowing was quantified as the RT difference between the post-signal trial and 
the last preceding no-signal trial. Positive scores indicate that subjects are slower than on the 
previous no-signal trial; negative scores indicate that they were faster. 
The descriptive statistics appear in Table 5. A univariate analysis revealed that 
properties of the previous trial influenced no-signal RT, but there was no main effect of group 
(control, reward, or punishment) or a Group by Trial Type interaction (Table 1). In other 
words, incentives did not modulate sequential effects in our study. This conclusion was 
further supported by Bayesian ANOVA (see Supplementary Materials). To explore the main 
effect of trial type in more detail, we performed a series of post-hoc tests. These appear in 
Table 2. As can be seen, no-signal RTs were generally longer after both valid and invalid 
signal trials than after no-signal trials (see also Table 5). There was no difference between 
trials that followed invalid-signal trials, unsuccessful valid-signal trials, or valid-signal trials. 
In other words, stop-signal presentation generally slowed responding on the subsequent trial, 
which seems consistent with the strategic adjustment account of Bissett and Logan (2011). 
Note that previous studies have also shown that the slowing is more pronounced when 
features of the previous trial are repeated (e.g. Verbruggen, Logan, et al., 2008); 
unfortunately, we could not test this here because the number of valid signal trials was too 
low.  
Table 5. No-signal RT difference as a function of the previous trial and group.
Group
Control
Punish
Reward
No-signal
M
-13
-14
-12
sd
12
10
11
Invalid-signal
M
22
30
27
sd
25
21
24
Signal-respond
(unsuccessful valid)
M
57
43
30
sd
67
52
64
Signal-inhibit
(successful valid)
M
27
40
28
sd
57
50
66
28
General Discussion
Incentives induce general slowing but do not influence the competition between going 
and stopping on signal trials
No-signal Go1-RTs increased more throughout the experiment in the reward and 
punishment groups than in the control group. The slowing in both groups can be attributed to 
extra ‘proactive inhibitory control’ adjustments. When subjects expect a stop signal, they 
monitor the environment and selectively attend to stop-signal features (e.g. Elchlepp et al. 
2016), and down-regulate attentional resources in the go task (e.g. Langford, Krebs, Talsma, 
Woldorff, & Boehler, in press). Furthermore, proactive inhibitory control can involve 
adjustments of response-selection thresholds and suppression of motor output to trade speed 
in the go task for success in the stop task (e.g. Aron, 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). The 
findings of the present study indicate that providing monetary incentives encouraged subjects 
to make such strategic adjustments4 (i.e. subjects in the incentive conditions approached the 
task differently).
Second, we explored if incentives influenced the dependence between going and 
stopping on valid-signal trials. Bissett and Logan (2014) found that the ‘no-signal minus 
signal-respond’ RT difference increased when the proportion of valid signals increased. Thus, 
the higher proportion of valid signals encouraged subjects to prioritize stopping (i.e. stopping 
was less influenced by processing in the primary go task). We expected that incentives on 
valid signal trials would have a similar effect. To our surprise, they didn’t: Average signal-
respond Go1-RT was shorter than no-signal Go1-RT in the three groups, but there were no 
statistically significant Group by Trial Type differences (note that this study was sufficiently 
4. In previous studies, we fitted the diffusion model or the linear ballistic accumulator model to our data to 
determine which processing parameters were adjusted when subjects expected a stop signal to occur (Jahfari et 
al., 2012; Logan et al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). In this study, we could not fit such a model to the 
no-signal data of the individual subjects because the number of trials was relatively low and some subjects did 
not make any errors (which caused further problems for the fitting).
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powered to detect small-effect sized interactions; see Supplementary Materials). Furthermore, 
we found that signal-respond Go1-RT was longer than no-signal Go1-RT for a similar subset 
of subjects in all groups (Figure S1). Finally, we observed similar ‘no-signal vs. invalid-
signal’ Go1-RT differences in the three groups. Combined, these findings indicate that signal 
processing was not influenced by reward or punishment.
It is possible that the high proportion of invalid-signal trials discouraged subjects 
from prioritizing the stop task on signal trials (Bissett & Logan, 2014). However, this did not 
discourage them from generally slowing down their Go1 responses, as indicated by the no-
signal trial analyses. In other words, our incentive manipulation encouraged subjects to 
change attentional and/or response settings in the primary go task, but they could not change 
the level of competition between going and stopping on signal trials. Slowing of all Go1 
responses may be the ‘default’ strategy when stopping is incentivized or when subjects expect 
a signal in the near future (e.g. when a traffic sign informs car drivers that they are near a 
school or playground, they slow down; they do not wait until they see children crossing the 
road to adjust their driving). Future proactive inhibitory control studies should further explore 
which factors influence strategy selection (including the optimality of various response 
strategies; see e.g. Miller et al., 2009). 
Alternative explanations for the response slowing
We propose that slowing on no-signal trials reflects proactive control adjustments. 
It is unlikely that the Go1-RT group differences reflected increased dual-task demands. After 
all, accuracy on no-signal trials should also be influenced by dual-task demands. As can be 
seen in the Appendix, go accuracy was similar for all groups. 
The slowing could also be due to the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations. Several 
studies have indicated that responding on no-signal trials is slowed when stimuli or stimulus 
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features of previous stop trials are repeated (e.g. Bissett & Logan, 2011; Rieger & Gauggel, 
1999; Verbruggen, Logan, et al., 2008; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). This stimulus-specific 
slowing has been attributed to the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations: a go stimulus 
becomes associated with a ‘stop’ representation on a stop trial; when it is repeated on a 
following no-signal trial, the stop representation is activated via memory retrieval, and this 
will suppress the go response or interfere with responding (Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014; 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). On valid signal trials, the retrieval of such associations would 
improve stop performance. Guitart-Massip and colleagues (2012) demonstrated that 
associative learning in response-inhibition tasks could be influenced by incentives. Thus, in 
the incentive conditions, the retrieval of stimulus-stop or signal-stop associations could have 
had a bigger impact on performance than in the control condition.
As mentioned in the sequential analysis section, we could not examine the 
contribution of stimulus-signal associations directly. Nevertheless, we think that it is unlikely 
that incentive-induced changes in associative mechanisms can account for group differences 
in response slowing on no-signal trials. Subjects only had to stop and change their response 
on a very small proportion of the trials (i.e. 8.3% of all trials). Thus, the go stimuli should 
have become associated with going rather than stopping (hence, Go1-RTs should have 
decreased throughout the experiment; instead, they increased). It seems also unlikely that 
altered performance on signal trials was influenced much by incentive-induced changes in 
memory retrieval or associative learning. The signal mapping changed constantly; 
consequently, the signal of the previous valid signal was repeated only on a small minority of 
the signal trials. Furthermore, the signal-respond Go1-RT data are inconsistent with a 
memory-retrieval account. After all, this account makes the same prediction as the task 
prioritization account: when the stop response is strongly activated, only the fastest trials can 
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escape inhibition. We already explained above that our data were inconsistent with this idea. 
Finally, we found that the difference between no-signal and invalid-signal trials decreased 
throughout the experiment. An associative account predicts the opposite. 
Another alternative account for our findings is that the response slowing is due to a 
gradual build-up of slowing caused by ‘reactive’ control adjustments after the presentation of 
a signal (see e.g. Bissett & Logan, 2011). Separating the proactive control account and the 
‘build-up’ account is difficult in the present study because the incentive manipulation was 
block-based. However, it seems unlikely that the slowing is entirely due to post-change-
signal adjustments. In the sequential analysis, we found that responding was slowed down 
after the presentation of an invalid or valid change signal, but this slowing was comparable 
for the three groups. Thus, a post-change-slowing account cannot explain the group 
differences observed in the main analyses. 
In sum, the group differences cannot easily be explained by a pure memory-retrieval 
account or a post-change-signal adjustment account. We cannot rule out some minor 
contribution of associative or memory-retrieval mechanisms and post-change-signal 
adjustments, but it seems that the slowing on no-signal and signal trials is primarily due to 
strategy adjustments and competition between decisional processes in the go and stop tasks. 
Effect of incentives on change latencies
The change-RT analysis showed that stop-change performance was better in the 
reward and punishment groups than in the control group. This improvement could be due to 
proactive control adjustments (see above). Incentives could also have had a more direct effect 
on reactive control. Previous work suggests that incentives can increase activity in the 
reactive inhibitory control network (Boehler et al., 2014). However, our Go1-RT analysis 
suggests that the decision to stop or not was not influenced much by incentives (i.e. we 
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observed similar differences between no-signal Go1-RTs and signal-respond & invalid-signal 
Go1-RTs in all three groups). This conclusion is further supported by the SSRT analysis. 
There were no statistically significant SSRT group differences (and the Bayes factors were 
inconclusive), but there were large change-RT differences. In stop-change tasks, subjects first 
stop their Go1 response and then execute the change response on valid-signal trials 
(Verbruggen, Schneider, et al., 2008). Our findings indicate that monetary incentives did not 
modulate the stop process much, but they did influence the selection and/or execution of the 
change response. 
The absence of a reliable effect on SSRT is inconsistent with previous studies (e.g. 
Greenhouse & Wessel, 2013; see also Boehler et al., 2012, 2014). Maybe this is due to the 
nature of the task, as most other studies have used stop-signal tasks in which only one signal 
could occur. Furthermore, in our SSRT analysis we had to exclude many subjects for which 
the assumptions of the independent race model were violated (and as a consequence of the 
lower N, the study could only detect large between-subject differences5). Consistent with this 
idea, we found effects of reward in the combined analysis. Therefore, the absence of a 
statistically significant effect on SSRT in the main experiment should be treated with caution. 
Note that this does not undermine our main conclusion, namely that incentives in our task 
encouraged response slowing but did not influence the dependence between going and 
stopping. 
Reward and punishment have similar effects on stop-change performance
Previous research suggests that reward and punishment may have distinct effects on 
learning in response-inhibition tasks. For example, subjects learn cue-go/no-go contingencies 
faster when correct go responses are rewarded and incorrect no-go responses are punished, 
5. The study was designed to detect within-between subjects interactions (see Method section). 
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than the other way around (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; 2012). This could be due to a hard-
wired link between reward/punishment and go/stop, respectively (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011, 
2012; Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). In the present study, performance in the reward and 
punishment groups was very similar and Bayesian analyses provided support for the null 
hypothesis (see also the Bayesian meta-analysis in Footnote 3). We observed very similar 
results in two pilot studies in which we observed differences between the control group and 
the reward and punishment groups, but no differences between the two incentive groups (see 
Supplementary Materials). 
Differences in design could potentially explain the apparent inconsistency between 
our study and the studies of Guitart-Massip and colleagues (2011, 2012). In their work, cues 
presented at the beginning of the trial indicated the combination of the go/no-go requirement 
and the outcome (reward/punishment). Thus, Guitart-Massip and colleagues used a very 
direct mapping between action and incentive type. In our study, there were no separate cues 
at the beginning of a trial, and there was no direct mapping between individual signals (i.e. 
the chequerboards), stopping, and reward/punishment because the signal rules changed 
constantly. (Note that we changed the rules because our previous work suggests that stopping 
and going compete more when the demands on the rule-based system are high; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2015). In other words, the mapping was indirect in our study, which could explain 
why we did not observe a difference between reward and punishment. 
It is also possible that we did not observe any differences because the effect of local 
incentives may depend on global incentives. Previous studies suggest that a match between 
global incentives (e.g. avoiding losing a bonus or obtaining a bonus) and local incentives 
(e.g. points deducted for incorrect responses or points awarded for correct responses) 
encourages flexible behavior, whereas a mismatch encourages behavioral inflexibility 
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(Maddox & Markman, 2010). In our experiments, there was a match between the global and 
local incentives in both the Reward group (subjects had to win a bonus and they could win 
points on every successful valid-signal trial) and the Punishment group (subjects had to avoid 
losing a £2.5 bonus and they could lose points on every unsuccessful valid-signal trial). This 
could explain why reward and punishment had a similar effect on flexible stop-change 
performance. Related to this idea, subjects in the punishment condition started with a bonus, 
so they could not lose their own money. Consequently, the main task goal could have been 
similar in both groups, namely trying to maximizing the bonus by accurate performance.  
Finally, it could be argued that both conditions involved some reward and 
punishment. In the punishment condition, subjects were punished for unsuccessful trials, but 
preventing a loss on successful trials might have been rewarding. In the reward group, 
subjects received a reward for successful trials, but the absence of a reward on unsuccessful 
trials could have been perceived as a negative event (see e.g. Verbruggen, Chambers, 
Lawrence, & McLaren, in press). Thus, it could be argued that both the punishment and 
reward groups contained some elements of reward (i.e. getting extra points or avoiding losing 
points) and punishment (i.e. losing points or not receiving extra points).
The present study cannot distinguish between these various accounts. Therefore, 
future research is required to test how different reward and punishment schemes can 
influence performance in the stop task and other cognitive paradigms.  
Conclusions
The present study showed that providing monetary incentives influenced both 
proactive slowing and reactive control (i.e. execution of a non-dominant, secondary response) 
in a selective stop-change task. By contrast, task prioritization or the competition between 
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going and stopping after a signal was presented was not influenced much by incentives. 
Furthermore, we found no effect of the type of (local) incentive. 
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Appendix A
Table A1. Overview of Go1 accuracy on no-signal trials and invalid-signal trials: probability of an 
accurate Go1 response [p(correct)] and probability of a missed Go1 response [p(miss)] as a function 
of Part (first half or second half of the experiment), Group (Control, Punishment, and Reward), and 
Trial Type (no signal vs. invalid signal). 
Note: Consistent with our previous research (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a, 2015), we distinguished 
between incorrect responses (i.e. subjects executed an incorrect response within the response interval) 
and missed responses (i.e. subjects did not execute any response within the response interval). The 
probability of a missed go response was generally very low, and therefore not further analyzed.
Table A2: Overview of the Analyses of Variance. Go Accuracy was analyzed by means of mixed 
ANOVAs with Group (Control, Punishment, Reward) as a between-subjects factor, and Part (first half. 
vs. second half of the experiment) as within-subjects factor. For the ‘Invalid-signal vs. no-signal’ 
analysis, we also included Trial Type as a within-subjects factor. P’s < .05 are in bold. 
Part 1
Part 2
Control:
Punish:
Reward:
Control:
Punish:
Reward:
no signal
invalid signal
no signal
invalid signal
no signal
invalid signal
no signal
invalid signal
no signal
invalid signal
no signal
invalid signal
P(correct)
M
0.972
0.925
0.976
0.934
0.975
0.932
0.972
0.956
0.982
0.955
0.984
0.970
sd
0.025
0.062
0.021
0.054
0.021
0.054
0.028
0.035
0.019
0.046
0.014
0.030
P(miss)
M
0.011
0.030
0.011
0.019
0.012
0.034
0.012
0.020
0.019
0.025
0.013
0.034
sd
0.010
0.028
0.013
0.026
0.023
0.039
0.014
0.024
0.032
0.034
0.019
0.041
No-signal: p(correct)
Invalid-signal vs. no-signal: p(correct)
Group
Part
Group by Part
Group
Part
Trial Type
Group by Part
Group by Trial Type
Part by Trial Type
Group:Part:Trial Type
df1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
df2
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
SS1
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.006
0.033
0.108
0.002
0.001
0.016
0.001
SS2
0.081
0.020
0.020
0.331
0.092
0.107
0.092
0.107
0.056
0.056
F
1.830
7.950
1.857
0.972
37.252
105.463
1.181
0.298
29.827
1.283
p
0.165
0.006
0.161
0.382
0.000
0.000
0.311
0.743
0.000
0.282
η2gen
0.027
0.015
0.007
0.010
0.053
0.155
0.004
0.001
0.026
0.002
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Appendix B 
Table B1: Overview of Group comparisons for change-RT after exclusion of subjects whose signal-
respond RT was longer than their no-signal RT. P’s < .05 after correct for multiple comparisons are in 
bold. 
Comparison
Control vs. Punish
Control vs. Reward
Punish vs. Reward
diff
92
86
-5
lower 
CI
27
25
-54
upper 
CI
156
148
43
df
37
40
41
t
2.887
2.833
0.220
p
.006
.007
.827
BF
6.980
6.375
0.307
g
0.906
0.862
0.066
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Supplementary Materials
Additional Results Main Experiment
Signal-respond vs. no-signal Go1-RTs. As mentioned in the main manuscript, the 
independent race model does not make any assumptions about whether the executed response 
on signal-respond trials should ‘match’ the stimulus (i.e. up for ‘U’ and down for ‘D’) or not. 
Therefore, we included all executed Go1 responses in the analysis reported in the main 
manuscript. However, we have also repeated the analysis after exclusion of non-matching 
responses. The results are shown in Tables S1 and S2. As can be seen, inclusion of these trials 
did not alter the main findings. 
Table S1. Average reaction time for Go1 responses on signal-respond trials (signal-respond Go1-RT) 
and the difference between signal-respond Go1-RT and no-signal Go1-RT as a function of part (first 
vs. second half of the experiment) and group (control, punishment, reward). 
Table S2: Latencies were analyzed by means of mixed ANOVAs with group (control, punishment, 
reward) as a between-subjects factor, part (first half. vs. second half of the experiment) and trial type 
(signal-respond vs. no-signal) as within-subjects factor. p’s < .05 are in bold. 
Independent variables
Part 1
Part 2
Control
Punish
Reward
Control
Punish
Reward
Signal-respond Go1-RT
M
697
721
740
713
774
810
sd
136
151
175
171
200
210
No-signal Go1-RT minus 
signal-respond Go1-RT
M
41
26
34
47
56
59
sd
75
72
78
55
61
64
Variable
Group
Part
Trial Type
Group by Part
Group by Trial Type
Part by Trial Type
Group:Part:Trial Type
df1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
df2
105
105
105
105
105
105
105
SS1
369459
346527
206691
79527
449
11587
2831
SS2
12648646
1185005
306227
1185005
306227
177128
177128
F
1.533
30.705
70.871
3.523
0.077
6.868
0.839
p
.221
< .001
< .001
.033
.926
.010
.435
η2gen
0.025
0.024
0.014
0.006
0.000
0.001
0.000
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Individual data. As discussed in the main manuscript, the independent race model 
predicts that signal-respond Go1-RT should be shorter than no-signal Go1-RT (i.e. signal-
respond Go1-RT minus no-signal Go1-RT should be smaller than 0). As can be seen in Figure 
S1, signal-respond Go1-RT was numerically longer than no-signal Go1-RT for a subset of the 
subjects in each group (approximately 25-30% of the subjects).
Control Punishment Reward
N  =  9
N  =  27N  =  0
N  =  10
N  =  26N  =  0
N  =  11
N  =  25N  =  0
N  =  9
N  =  27N  =  0
N  =  8
N  =  28N  =  0
N  =  8
N  =  27N  =  1
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Figure S1. Numerical difference scores for all subjects in the incentive groups for each part. The 
numbers in the graph indicate the number of subjects per quadrant (unlike previous work, we used the 
observed numerical values to determine the number of subjects in each group; see Bissett & Logan, 
2014, and Verbruggen & Logan, 2015, for a more elaborate discussion).
Go1-RT and change-RT distributions. The independent race model predicts that 
signal–respond and no-signal distributions have a common minimum, but later diverge (see 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). The average Go1 distributions, shown in Figure S2, are 
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consistent with this prediction, although it should be noted that violations of the 
independence assumption are observed for individual subjects (Figure S1). 
Control Punishment Reward
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Figure S2. Percentile averages for signal–respond trials, no-signal trials, and invalid-signal trials for 
each group. For this graph, we included incorrectly executed go responses – e.g. when subjects 
pressed the ‘up’ key instead of the ‘down’ key.
The difference between the no-signal and invalid-signal distributions is consistent 
with our previous research, and suggests dependence between going and stopping (see 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2015, for a detailed discussion). Note that the no-signal and invalid 
signal distributions should overlap for percentiles 10-50, but then diverge substantially if 
subjects stopped all responses when signals occur. Inspection of the figure indicates that even 
the fastest go responses, which occurred approximately 150–200 ms after the presentation of 
the signal, were influenced by the presentation of invalid signals. 
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Figure S3 shows the average distributions of change latencies on successful valid-
signal trials (i.e. trials on which subjects correctly suppressed the up/down response and 
responded to the location of the signal instead). As can be seen, the change-RT distribution of 
the Control group is shifted to the right. In other words, incentives primarily influenced the 
mean of the change-RT distribution, rather than the shape of it. 
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Control Punishment Reward
Figure S3. Percentile averages for successful valid-change trials.
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Bayesian ANOVA. For the RT analyses, we also calculated Bayes factors for all main 
effects and interaction contrasts in the ANOVA designs (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, 
Province, 2012). We calculated the Bayes factors with the BayesFactor package in R, using 
the default prior (Morey & Rouder, 2015). We computed Bayes factors for all possible 
combinations of fixed factors and interactions, against the null hypothesis that all effects are 
0. To reduce the number of model comparisons, interactions were only allowed if all 
constituent sub-effects were also included (see Morey & Rouder, 2015). 
The outcome of the Bayesian analyses are presented in Tables S3-6. The models are 
rank-ordered based on the Bayes factors, and the favored model is on top of the list. Note that 
‘subject’ was included as a factor for all models, but this factor is not added to the model 
descriptions in the tables to reduce the amount of text. 
As can be seen, the Bayesian analyses are largely consistent with the ANOVAs 
reported in the main manuscript. The favored models in Tables S3-S5 included the Part by 
Group interaction, which provides further support for the idea that RT increased more 
throughout the experiment in the incentive groups than in the control group. Furthermore, the 
favored models in Tables S4 and S5 did not include the Group by Trial Type interactions, 
providing further support for the conclusions that incentives did not influence the difference 
between no-signal trials and signal trials. In other words, incentives did not influence task 
prioritization or the degree of parallel processing. They also did not influence sequential 
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Table S3: No-signal Go1-RT Bayes analysis. 
Table S4: Signal-respond vs. no-signal Go1-RT Bayes analysis. 
Note: trial = trial type (signal-respond vs. no-signal). 
Model
part + group + part:group
part 
part + group
group
Bayes factor
250041
184675
101370
0.51
Confidence 
interval
±6.9%
±0.86%
±1.73%
±0.97%
Model
group + part + group:part + trial 
group + part + group:part + trial + part:trial 
group + part + group:part + trial + group:trial 
part + trial 
group + part + trial 
group + part + group:part + trial + group:trial + part:trial 
part + trial + part:trial 
group + part + trial + part:trial 
group + part + group:part + trial + group:trial + part:trial + 
group:part:trial 
group + part + trial + group:trial 
group + part + trial + group:trial + part:trial 
group + part + group:part 
part 
group + part 
trial 
group + trial 
group + trial + group:trial 
group 
Bayes factor
1.07E+17
4.47E+16
5.28E+15
4.69E+15
2.89E+15
2.36E+15
1.99E+15
1.23E+15
2.83E+14
1.52E+14
5.54E+13
8.65E+10
7.79E+09
4.49E+09
5.89E+04
3.32E+04
1.68E+03
5.48E-01
Confidence 
interval
±5.31%
±3.63%
±3.01%
±2.36%
±4.95%
±4.98%
±4.09%
±4.88%
±8.13%
±4.15%
±2.56%
±1.95%
±1.95%
±2.31%
±1.39%
±2.99%
±2.52%
±1.61%
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Table S5: Invalid-signal vs. no-signal Go1-RT Bayes analysis. 
Note: trial = trial type (invalid-signal vs. no-signal). 
Table S6: Sequential no-signal Go1-RT Bayes analysis. 
Note: previous trial = a correct no-signal trial, a correct invalid-signal trial, a successful (signal-
inhibit) valid-signal trial, or an unsuccessful (signal-respond) valid-signal trial.
Model
part + trial + part:trial + group + part:group 
part + trial + group + part:group 
part + trial + part:trial + group + part:group + trial:group 
part + trial + part:trial + group + part:group + trial:group + 
part:trial:group
part + trial + part:trial 
part + trial + part:trial + group 
part + trial + group + part:group + trial:group 
part + trial 
part + trial + group 
part + trial + part:trial + group + trial:group 
part + trial + group + trial:group 
trial 
trial + group 
trial + group + trial:group 
part + group + part:group 
part 
part + group 
group 
Bayes factor
9.88E+35
5.37E+34
4.69E+34
4.96E+33
4.12E+33
2.43E+33
2.20E+33
2.78E+32
1.75E+32
1.15E+32
7.39E+30
5.64E+24
3.50E+24
1.57E+23
5.82E+05
7.14E+04
6.65E+04
5.32E-01
Confidence 
interval
±5.76%
±7.27%
±5.23%
±8.8%
±1.85%
±6.36%
±3.59%
±4.85%
±9.57%
±4.6%
±6.24%
±0.75%
±3.1%
±4.19%
±3.47%
±0.81%
±42.85%
±1.23%
Model
previous trial
previous trial + group 
previous trial + group + previous trial:group
group
Bayes factor
1.26E+18
7.95E+16
7.41E+15
0.054
Confidence 
interval
±0.59%
±0.92%
±1.11%
±0.53%
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Two Pilot Experiments 
In two pilot behavioral experiments, we examined the effects of reward and 
punishment on performance in two other variants of the stop-signal task. The tasks were 
optimized for ERP purposes (initially we were planning a series of ERP studies to examine 
the effects of reward and punishment on ‘reactive’ attentional and response-related processes 
on signal trials). Note that sensitivity analyses showed that these experiments could only 
detect large between-group differences. 
In both experiments, there were three groups: a punishment group, a reward group, 
and a control group. In Pilot Experiment 1 (N = 72; 24 subjects per group), we used a hybrid 
version of a go/no-go task and a stop-change task (as used in Elchlepp & Verbruggen, 2016); 
in Pilot Experiment 2, we used a stop-signal task (N = 108; 36 subjects per group). All 
signals were valid and we used a very strict response-deadline procedure to discourage 
proactive slowing. 
A detailed overview of the experiments, methods, results, and all raw data and 
analysis scripts are deposited in the Open Research Exeter data repository (http://
hdl.handle.net/10871/18924). In both experiments, punishment and reward influenced 
measures of reactive and proactive control (despite the strict response deadline on no-signal 
trials). Importantly, Bayesian analyses indicated that there were no differences between the 
Reward and Punishment groups, which is consistent with the results reported in the main 
manuscript. 
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